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C.G. Jung and the Inheritance of Immanence:
Traces of Spinozistic, Nietzschean, and Freudian 
Influence in Analytical Psychology
Christopher Myers
Carl Jung, the founder of analytical psychology, was heavily influenced by both Nietzsche and 
Freud, both of whom were influenced, as Yovel notes in his The Adventures of Immanence, 
by Spinoza. Through his years of collaboration with Freud and his long-lasting fascination with 
Nietzsche (combined with Jung’s own semi-mystical tendencies, Jung became more of a Spinozian, 
than Nietzschean or Freudian. These Spinozistic traces can be detected in the framework of 
analytical psychology. A comparison is presented on the views of Spinoza, Nietzsche, Freud, and 
Jung on historical religion, the source of human motivation, and the liberating power of self-
knowledge. 
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This investigation explores the intellectual genealogy that links seventeenth-cen-tury rationalist and Jewish ex-communicant, Baruch Spinoza, to the founder of 
analytical psychology, Carl Gustav Jung. In Spinoza and Other Heretics: The Adventures of 
Immanence, Yirmiyahu Yovel describes Spinoza’s influence upon Nietzsche and Freud. In 
Philosophical Issues in the Psychology of C.G. Jung, Marilyn Nagy investigates the inspiration 
of Plato, Kant, Schopenhauer and others on Jung. However, no effort has been made to in-
vestigate the possibility that Spinozism might have trickled into Jungian thought through 
Nietzsche and Freud. Not only do I plan to shine a light on these Spinozistic traces, but I 
also plan to show that Jungian thought parallels that of Spinoza more closely than that of 
Nietzsche or Freud.
It should be noted that these Spinozistic traces in analytical psychology are likely 
present because of intellectual inheritance rather than deliberate appropriation. In the en-
tirety of Jung’s Collected Works there are only a handful of mentions of Spinoza. In The 
Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, Jung briefly laments that Spinoza was one of the first 
philosophers to devaluate the “metaphysical value” of the archetype (Structure 136). Then, 
in Psychological Types, Jung points to Spinoza as a perfect representative of the “intrinsic 
certainty,” or “conviction” that accompanies intuitive knowledge (Psychological 453). Clearly, 
Jung had some level of exposure to Spinoza, but his grasp and overall opinion of Spinozism 
remains unclear.  
While Jung gives Spinoza only a couple brief and seemingly ambivalent mentions 
within his oeuvre, Jung mentions the name of Nietzsche, the man who enthusiastically 
referred to Spinoza as his own “precursor” no less than nine times in Jung’s autobiogra-
phy, Memories, Dreams, Reflections. Only Goethe and Freud are mentioned more frequently. 
Jung was fascinated by Nietzsche, but he hesitated to read Nietzsche’s work for many years, 
for fear that he might turn out too much like the German philosopher. In some ways, Jung 
was correct. Both he and Nietzsche were raised by clergymen, and both men had “inner 
experiences” they found difficult to share with the rest of the world. Jung even attended 
Basel University, where Nietzsche had been made a professor years earlier. Jung feared their 
similarities might run deeper, and that he, like Nietzsche, might go mad. Curiosity eventu-
ally overcame Jung’s fear, and he described his first reading of Thus Spoke Zarathustra as a 
“tremendous experience” (Memories 102). The reading left such an impression on him that 
he would deliver a series of lectures on Zarathustra years later. It is difficult to overstate 
Nietzsche’s influence on Jung, yet another figure looms even larger in his history.
Sigmund Freud, the father of psychoanalysis, Carl Jung’s mentor, and the man who 
would proclaim Jung the “crown-prince of psychoanalysis,” mentions Spinoza rarely, but, 
when he does so, it is typically to remark on their similarities. In a letter to Dr. Lothar 
Bickel, a Spinozist interested in the practice of psycho-analysis, Freud admits his debt to 
Spinoza, but he tempers his admission with the remark that, “I conceived my hypotheses 
from the atmosphere created by him, rather than from the study of his work” (Yirmiyahu 
139). Freud clearly appreciated Spinoza, even if he denied a need for “philosophical legiti-
mization.” Freud, like Jung with Nietzsche, recognized the numerous similarities between 
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himself and Spinoza: both he and Spinoza were Jewish men separated from their tradition, 
both challenged gentile society with their rationalism, and both were met with tremendous 
resistance. Freud suspected that, in his own case, the resistance could be the result of his 
heritage. Therefore, he looked to his gentile disciple, Jung, to promote psychoanalysis. 
Jung owes much to each of these predecessors. From Nietzsche, Jung would draw his 
love for individualism and a deterministic viewpoint reminiscent of amor fati. From Freud, 
Jung would inherit not only his technical expertise, but also the basis for many of the con-
cepts he would refine within his own school of Analytical Psychology, concepts such as 
libido, the unconscious, and defense mechanisms. From both men, Jung would, perhaps un-
knowingly, inherit a great deal of Spinozism. The Jungian ideas that are most closely related 
to those of Spinoza are his concept of God, especially in connection with historical religion; 
his understanding of conatus, will to power, and libido; and his belief in the transformative 
and liberating power of self-knowledge.
God and the Problem of Historical Religion
Spinoza was excommunicated for ideas that were interpreted as atheistic, but the lan-
guage he utilizes in the Ethics opens the door for plenty of semi-mystical, metaphysical 
possibilities. For example, Spinoza claims that God is “…an absolutely infinite being, that 
is, substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite 
essence” (Ethics 31). This, at least, seems to eliminate the possibility of a personal, yet tran-
scendent God who creates matter ex-nihilo. Consider the following as well: “…all things 
are in God and are so dependent on him that they can neither be nor be conceived without 
him…” (Spinoza, Ethics 57). One might argue that Spinoza is describing a pantheistic God, 
but this is not necessarily so. Spinoza is describing God’s participation in the universe and it 
in him, but he is not necessarily equating the two. In a letter to Henry Oldenberg, Spinoza 
plainly states, “As to the view of certain people that I identify god with nature (taken as a 
kind of mass or corporeal matter), they are quite mistaken” (Correspondence 73). 
This letter, when taken into context, suggests that Spinoza likely held a panentheistic 
view of God, rather than a strictly materialist or pantheistic view. In other words, a single 
source exists that permeates the universe, but it is neither separated from the universe, as a 
pantheistic view would suggest, nor is it simply matter, as a materialist thinker would per-
ceive the Divine. This panentheistic view is not a completely unique point of view among 
Jewish thinkers at the time; Cordovero, writing a full century before Spinoza, speculated 
that “God is all reality, but not all reality is God” (Scholem 252). It is well worth noting, 
when one considers the overwhelming atheism of Jung’s influences, that Jung would share 
this panentheistic view with Spinoza when his explanation of the collective unconscious 
matured. 
Spinoza’s opinion on the matter of historical religion is far clearer than his theology. 
Without a doubt, Spinoza detested historical religion, insulting it as superstitio and vana re-
ligio. One can almost feel Spinoza’s abhorrence when reading the Ethics: “So it came about 
that every individual devised different methods of worshipping as he thought fit in order 
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that God should love him beyond others and direct the whole of Nature so as to serve his 
blind cupidity and insatiable greed” (58). Spinoza wanted traditional religion eliminated 
and he had just the thing to replace it: a universal religion guided by reason instead of 
dogmatic belief. Spinoza believed that through amor dei intellectualis, man would discover a 
state of freedom from his passions. 
Nietzsche famously proclaimed, “God is dead,” in both The Gay Science and Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. For Nietzsche, there was no Divine Being pronouncing moral commandments 
from on high, demanding blood sacrifices, and encouraging the stoning of individuals for 
relatively minor offences. It should come as no surprise then, considering Nietzsche’s bla-
tant atheism, that he held an unfavorable view of historical religion. Nietzsche did not even 
share in Spinoza’s immanence. Nietzsche saw no reason or order to the universe, whatsoev-
er. However, one might be surprised to note that in Will to Power, Nietzsche briefly reveals 
a desire to embrace pantheism, but he quickly disregards it as a temptation to believe in the 
shadow of the old, dead God. 
Far more in line with Nietzsche than Spinoza, Freud declared the notion of God to be 
an illusion, an outward expression of an inner need for a father figure. Furthermore, Freud 
believed that although religion might have once been useful in promoting social unity, it 
was now a “mass-delusion” that should be eradicated (26). Like Spinoza, Freud believed he 
had discovered the replacement for historical religion, but for Freud, this replacement was 
the “dogma” of psychoanalysis. Freud likened himself to Moses, who would never see the 
Promised Land to which his teachings would lead all humanity. Unfortunately for Freud, 
his gentile Joshua did not adhere to some of his most fundamental doctrines.
Jung’s understanding of God is far more difficult to pin down than the three described 
above, because, throughout his long life, Jung’s concept of evolved significantly. For ex-
ample, with only a cursory glance, we might become convinced that Jung shared Freud’s 
atheism. Jung, in fact, often described himself as a strict empiricist. However, Jung was con-
vinced he had psychological reasons for at least entertaining the idea of a God, although he 
would never commit to knowledge of whether God was an actual entity or merely a psychic 
construct. However, in a mystical treatise never meant for publication, Septem Sermones ad 
Mortuem (which one might call an early experiment in active imagination and/or a gnostic-
hymn), the narrator Basilides plainly contradicts Nietzsche’s famous proclamation by tell-
ing his ghostly audience, “God is not dead. Now, as ever, he liveth” ( Jung, Memories 382). 
Early in his career, Jung aligned himself closely with Freud. However, following their 
schism, Jung grew ever more and more comfortable with situating the collective uncon-
scious and its archetypes outside of neurological structures, genetics, or socio-cultural pro-
gramming, and into the metaphysical realm. Eventually, he all but explicitly identified the 
collective unconscious with God. If we regard the collective unconscious as the source 
and entirety of psychic reality, with psychic reality constructing what we might perceive 
as “external,” then another look at the Sermones should be quite illuminating: “Moreover, 
God is the pleroma itself, as likewise, each smallest point in the created and uncreated is 
the pleroma itself ” ( Jung, Memories 382) and “[the pleroma] is both the beginning and the 
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end of created beings. It pervadeth them as the light of the sun pervadeth the air” ( Jung, 
Memories 379). Of course, this singular essence of all things should remind us of Spinoza’s 
panenthesitic God.
If Jung indeed held this view that God, the pleroma, and the collective unconscious 
were the same, then it makes sense that Jung would share a similar Spinozistic disapproval 
for historical religion. Referring again to the Sermones, Jung writes, “Least of all availeth 
it to worship the first God, the effective abundance and summum bonum. By our prayer we 
can add to it nothing and from it nothing take…” (Memories 386). To Jung, no religion 
would be literally true, nor useful, to God Himself. In Memories, Dreams, Reflections, Jung 
recalls a childhood dream, which he was too terrified to share with any adults, in which 
God defecated on a church. I doubt I can find a better description of Jung’s feelings for 
historical religion. 
Of course, just because Jung believed no historical religion was to be taken literally 
did not mean he found religious practices to be completely worthless. In fact, Jung often 
used religion as part of his treatment for neuroses. In Modern Man in Search of a Soul, Jung 
shares with the reader that among all his patients over the age of thirty-five, not one of 
them had a problem that was not, at its core, an issue of lost religion. In his opinion, re-
ligion could bring meaning to a patient’s life, but he takes great care to note that this has 
“nothing whatever to do with a particular creed or membership of a church” ( Jung, Modern 
264). It is important to remember that although Jung did not share Freud’s conviction that 
religion was simply an illusory crutch, he also advocated his own therapeutic method over 
any historical religion. 
Conatus, Will to Power, and Libido
Another Jungian concept that meshes better with Spinozistic thought than Nietzs-
chean or Freudian is the source of human drive, affect, and motivation. Spinoza called 
the source of all human behavior conatus. All psychic traits spring from conatus, including 
aggression, empathy, and even amor dei intellectualis. Perhaps most importantly, conatus is 
responsible for self-preservation. Spinoza explains that conatus is the drive through which, 
“Everything endeavors to persist in its being” (Ethics 108). This is important to note, when 
comparing Spinoza’s work with that of Freud, that conatus is monistic. Therefore, conatus 
can only lead to self-destruction through individuals’ misunderstandings of their own cona-
tus, because “Nothing can be destroyed except by causes external to itself ” (Spinoza, Ethics 
108). 
Nietzsche also espoused a single principle that guides all human behavior, which he 
christened the will to power. Will to power might best be understood as a sense of ambition. 
It is purely egoistic, never altruistic. However, will to power is not simply the desire to suc-
ceed in mating or business. It is the drive always to strive for a better position in life. This 
is not unlike Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Once one has found food, one secures shelter. If 
one has secured shelter, one seeks out friendship and so on. Nietzsche was convinced that 
all these acts were performed, not because an organism wished simply to perpetuate itself, 
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but because all beings wished to become more than they are at a given time. Spinoza might 
counter this argument by pointing out that one’s conatus would indeed lead one to pursue a 
better position in life, but this would be accomplished in an effort better to preserve oneself.
Libido, or fundamental psychic energy, is the driving principle in Freudian thought. 
It arises from the id and is therefore primarily sexual in nature. Just as with conatus or will 
to power, libido is a purely naturalistic principle – it presupposes no “soul,” “spirit,” or any 
other transcendental quality. Unlike conatus, however, it is not monistic, but dualistic. Li-
bido consists of two instincts, eros and thanatos. Eros, which may seem quite similar to will 
to power, is the pursuit of life and growth. Thanatos is primarily destructive in nature, even 
self-destructive. Because of this capability for self-destruction, it is of the utmost impor-
tance, in Freud’s mind, that an individual redirect and externalize one’s thanatos. When-
ever externalization becomes impossible, as it often will in our society, thanatos must be 
sublimated. Spinoza would no doubt find this absurd. As mentioned above, in Spinozistic 
theory, only something external to a thing can destroy it. Therefore, no being can actually 
have a will to destroy itself.
While Freud drifts into dualism with eros and thanatos, Jung maintains the monistic 
nature of Spinoza’s conatus: “…there is only one striving, the striving after your own being” 
(Memories 382). However, Jung would maintain Freudian nomenclature. To Jung, libido 
was neither purely sexual (although it could be), nor did it involve any particular instinct 
for self-destruction (although, again, this was a distinct possibility). Libido was, instead, all 
psychic energy. The source of this energy was not the id or even the ego, but the tension that 
exists between an individual’s ego and the collective unconscious. In a view that is again 
closer to Nietzschean individualism or Spinozistic conatus than that expressed by Freud, 
Jung describes the primary function of the libido as individuation: a drive for constant bet-
terment and greater psychic balance. The key to individuation is self-knowledge.
Transformation and Liberation via Self-Knowledge
Spinoza, Nietzsche, Freud, and Jung each saw self-knowledge as the key to liberation/
salvation, but what that meant to each individual is quite different. According to Spinoza, 
knowledge of God and one’s place within his essence will lead to salvation (Ethics 23). 
Therefore, within Spinoza’s approach, one learns and grows through observation of the 
external world, which is part of God. In other words, through science one develops an un-
derstanding of God/nature and is thereby liberated from one’s passions, but only if science 
(1) can be “conceived and felt as explicating a basic metaphysical truth, namely the identity 
of nature with God and of the individual’s essence with the nature-God” (Yirmiyahu 148), 
and (2) “discursive scientific progress must eventually give way to the synthetic intuition” 
(Yirmiyahu 148). Spinoza advocates this process, science, as a means to probe the imma-
nent universe and to understand one’s own place within it.
Nietzsche, on the other hand, was not concerned with liberation from the passions, 
but rather with freedom from moral-slavery. Ethics or morality would not, for him, be 
bound by a transcendental concept like God, but simply by our natural tendencies of self-
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overcoming. If this path of self-overcoming were to reach its eventual end, one would be-
come the Übermensch, a man with no need for religion. As an Übermensch, one would finally 
embrace the world with amor fati and a willingness to submit to “eternal recurrence.” Ni-
etzsche’s self-knowledge, which is closer to disillusionment than anything, may initially 
lead to suffering, but it should eventually be overcome by joy. This is the central theme of 
the Gay Science. 
Freud wrote that there were three sources of human suffering: the body, which is 
“doomed to decay and dissolution,” the external world with “its merciless forces of destruc-
tion,” and our relationships with other humans (26). Humanity and civilization put great 
strains on the individual, who then begins to repress desires and painful memories. These 
memories are forced down into the unconscious and arise later in life in the form of neu-
roses. Freud advocated focusing on one’s inner, psychic states (instead of external factors 
as Spinoza instructed). By this method, as Freud taught, neurotics might expose repressed 
psychic material and cure themselves. It is important to note, however, that Freud did not 
believe this process would bring about any special, enlightened state. He believed only 
that through a willingness to embrace one’s impotence in the world, one might find peace 
enough to “love and to work.” 
Jung, on the other hand, saw therapy as the key to freedom from complexes and to a 
special, semi-enlightened state of psychic-balance. Jung called this process individuation. 
A fully individuated person is capable of juggling the needs of the collective unconscious, 
the personal subconscious, the ego, and the Self. In other words, one is able to become a 
complete human being. One could reach this state of fullness by means of various practices 
that might include traditional talking and dream therapy along with other forms of cre-
ative expression possibly including painting, poetry, dance, etc. In this manner, one could 
unravel the negative emotions surrounding his/her archetypes and edge the seat of one’s 
consciousness away from the ego, toward the Self, one’s subconscious God-image. Keep in 
mind, Jung was not suggesting we identify with our God-image (which would lead to ego-
inflation); we should simply bring our own desires and values into alignment with it. Only 
then, Jung taught, would one be freed from the control of the passions.
While Nietzsche saw self-knowledge as a means of creating meaning in a meaningless 
existence and Freud saw it as a panacea for psychic disease, Spinoza and Jung saw the ac-
quirement of self-knowledge as something of a religious experience. Although Jung clearly 
draws his terminology from Freud, his individuation process bears a greater resemblance to 
Spinoza’s method than Freud’s. Like Freud, however, Jung turns Spinoza’s search for self-
knowledge inward. This inner work is the purposeful re-organization of psychic contents in 
order to discover the proper place of one’s ego within the universal expanse of mind. 
From Spinoza to Jung
This essay has shown the effect Spinozism had on the development of analytical 
psychology through the dual-influence of admitted admirers of Spinoza, Nietzsche and 
Freud, which led to Jung becoming closer to a Spinozist than either of his influences. Al-
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though Spinoza and Jung held slightly differing opinions on historical religion, they shared 
a panentheistic view of God (a view not shared by Nietzsche or Freud). Jung’s unique 
understanding of libido as the source of human drive resembles the singular essence of co-
natus far more than it resembles Freud’s overly-sexualized concept of libido or Nietzsche’s 
will to power. Finally, while Nietzsche saw self-knowledge as a source of personal meaning 
and Freud saw it as psychological remedy, Spinoza and Jung saw the acquirement of self-
knowledge as a religious experience. Spinoza advocated this pursuit as a means to probe the 
immanent universe and to understand one’s place within it. Jung’s individuation process, 
although similar, takes the search for self-knowledge down to the microcosmic level. 
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